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The economist needs the three great intellectual facilities, perception, imagination and 
reason : and most of all he needs imagination[.]      —Marshall (1961, 43) 
1. An approach to economic evolution 
Although many contributors to economic thought and analysis have been ‘verging 
on the high theme of economic progress’ (Marshall, 1961, 460), the modern forms 
of evolutionary economics did not start to emerge before about 30 years ago (Witt, 
1993). Even from this start, modern evolutionary economics has encompassed 
different approaches. They range from very general analyses of evolutionary 
games to specific studies of industrial dynamics, and the diversity has significantly 
increased over the years (Nelson, 1995; Dopfer, 2001; Potts, 2000; Foster and 
Metcalfe, 2001). So we are forced to ask what—if anything—is common for all 
these diverse studies of economic evolution. 
 The present paper suggests that an important part of the actual and potential 
unity is found in the basic ways we think about economic evolution and in the 
analytic tools we apply to sharpen this thinking. Since evolutionary thinking and 
its analytic tools have not yet reached maturity, a simple survey does little to find 
and promote unity. Instead, we have to reconstruct and systematise evolutionary 
thought and the related tools, so the required effort in evolutionary economics may 
be compared with what Samuelson (1983) did for neoclassical economics in his 
Foundations of Economic Analysis. Like Samuelson, we need to find common 
denominators beneath the highly diverse surface of the literature. We may even 
find some room for a comparative static analysis of evolution. Our study will lead 
to results that are different from those of Samuelson, however. The reason is that 
while his neoclassical analysis is based on substantively rational agents and tends 
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to be performed in terms of representative agents, evolutionary economic analysis 
is based on boundedly rational agents and takes the form of population thinking. 
 Theoretical analysis has revealed that the most important prerequisite for 
evolutionary economic theorising is to take serious the differences that exist within 
and between populations of economic agents. This may seem a trivial requirement, 
but in practice it is not at all easy to perform this kind of analysis. Many have 
learnt to think in terms of statistical ‘populations’ when analysing the significance 
of empirical data, but it is less common to use the changing statistical properties of 
real populations to obtain a basic understanding of their evolution. Instead, there is 
a widespread tendency to treat such real populations as classes that can be 
characterised by a few common characteristics. Since Plato, there have actually 
been standard philosophical arguments for abstracting from the myriad of 
‘superficial’ variations in order to concentrate on the underlying ‘idea’ or ‘type’ 
that basically characterise the population. But this typological thinking is a major 
obstacle for an adequate treatment of evolution. Instead we need a population 
thinking that means that we deal with heterogeneous populations and to consider 
outliers as even more important than normal agents (Mayr, 1976; Metcalfe, 2001). 
This heterogeneity of populations is upheld by the behavioural inertia that 
characterises boundedly rational agents. If we study the distribution of behaviour 
(like strategy or productivity) in such a population, we normally observe that this 
distribution evolve over time. We also recognise that this evolution may be 
ascribed to two main forces. Selection is the force that implies that firms with 
different values of the characteristic have different growth rates. Thus selection 
presupposes variance with respect to a particular characteristic, and this 
characteristic must be important in each member’s environment (including the 
other members of the population). Selection means that the mean value of the 
characteristic of the population will change. But this mean may also change 
because of innovation, imitation, learning and random drift. The latter factors of 
change may be grouped under the heading of innovation and they can, at least 
conceptually, be distinguished from selection. 
 Even from this short account of population thinking, it becomes obvious that 
this form of thinking has a statistical orientation. This fact is a source of both the 
unity and the difficulties of modern evolutionary economics. We have to apply 
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some sort of statistical analysis in any kind of evolutionary study—from the 
evolution that takes place within a large firm via evolution of an industry to 
evolution at the regional, national and global levels. In all cases, we have to 
specify populations, behavioural characteristics, and the changing distributions of 
these characteristics. Whether we like it or not, we thus see that statistics enter 
even at the ground level of our thinking, where we define what to look for. The 
problem here is that few are accustomed to this kind of statistical thinking—partly 
because has poor support from commonly known analytic tools. To promote the 
unity of evolutionary economics there is thus a need for providing basic tools for 
population analysis. The potential of such tools is not only to unify different 
theoretical approaches but also to unify theoretical and empirical analyses of 
evolution.  
 The tools that support population thinking are to a large extent available, but 
they have mainly been developed within evolutionary biology. Therefore, there is 
a need to consider to which extent these tools are not only relevant for 
evolutionary biology but also for the study all other forms of evolution. That this is 
actually the case has become increasingly clear (Frank, 1998). It was R. A. Fisher 
(1999) who formulated the foundations for general evolutionary analysis through 
his combined efforts of developing modern statistics and modern evolutionary 
analysis. These foundations were largely formulated as a general theory of 
selection. At the very core of this theory is Fisher’s so-called fundamental theorem 
of natural selection that says that the speed of evolutionary change is determined 
by the behavioural variance within a population. Fisher’s immediate topic was 
biological evolution, but his analysis has full generality. He was actually 
proposing to treat selection in terms of what has later been called replicator 
dynamics or distance-from-mean dynamics. Thus the biologically oriented Fisher 
theorem may be seen as the application of a general Fisher Principle that is 
relevant for all forms of evolutionary processes (Metcalfe, 1994; 1998). However, 
Fisher’s analysis is excluding what in the present paper is called localised 
innovation. Therefore, his equations do not cover the general case in which this 
phenomenon is present to a smaller or larger degree. George R. Price (1970; 
1972a) solved this problem by developing a general method for partitioning of 
evolution. Thereby he not only clarified Fisher’s main result about natural 
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selection (Price, 1972b) and helped to lay the foundation for evolutionary game 
theory (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). He also developed a general and very 
fruitful decomposition of any evolutionary change, and thereby he formulated the 
core of a general evolutionary analysis (Frank 1995; 1998).  
 The simple Price equation serves to formalise what may be called intra-
population thinking by focussing the attention on selection and localised 
innovation. His analysis is very basic and it has, to some extent, been rediscovered 
in Metcalfe’s (1998; 2001) statistically oriented evolutionary economics and even 
in Nelson and Winter’s (1982) pioneering contribution. However, the historical 
and statistical study of real processes of economic evolution is confronted with the 
problem of defining the units of selection. Since these units can both be national 
economies, regional industries, corporations, plants, work groups and individual 
employees, there is obviously a need to move from simple intra-population 
thinking to multi-level population thinking. Somewhat surprisingly, Price’s 
approach can immediately be applied to the formalisation of the thinking in terms 
of multiple levels of selection. Thereby the approach serves to overcome the 
controversy within evolutionary biology between the majority view that only 
individual organisms are selected and the minority view that emphasises group-
level selection (Hamilton, 1996; Frank, 1998). But Price’s method of analysis is 
even more helpful in evolutionary economics. Here we simply start by partitioning 
of aggregate evolutionary change in terms of higher-level units (like corporations). 
Thereby we obtain a selection effect and a preliminary innovation effect. The 
preliminary innovation effect can be partitioned in terms of Price’s equation. 
Thereby it becomes clear that it includes both selection within the units (e.g. 
selection between plants) and a more narrowly defined innovation effect. This 
analysis of the innovation effect can go on until we reach units of selection with no 
meaningful intra-unit selection. Obviously, it is not the same type of selection that 
takes place at the different levels of selection. At some levels the selection comes 
close to what biologists call natural selection and at other levels we may be dealing 
with conscious or artificial selection. But this is no problem for Price’s approach 
that operates in terms of a fully general concept of selection. 
  The first beginnings of an evolutionary economic exploitation of the simple 
and the multi-level versions of Price’s equation can be found in evolutionary game 
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theory. Here Price’s equation is used to analyse the emergence of cooperation in 
small to medium-sized human groups—irrespective of whether cooperative 
behaviour is genetically or culturally determined (Gintis, 2000, Ch. 11). This 
analysis immediately leads to the study of the emergence of the institutions (i.e. 
higher-level selection environments) that make it advantageous to perform the 
‘altruistic punishment’ necessary to uphold a high level of cooperative behaviour 
(Gifford, 2000; Boyd et al., 2003). But the narrowly defined issues normally 
studied by evolutionary game theory may imply that the full generality of Price’s 
approach is not recognised (Price, 1995; Knudsen, 2002). Here the empirically 
oriented evolutionary economics of the Nelson–Winter tradition may be more 
helpful.  At the same time, the connection to relatively complex empirical studies 
makes clear a core characteristic of Price’s equations for both simple and multi-
level analysis: they are designed for the analysis of relatively short-term studies (as 
emphasised by Frank, 1998, Ch. 1).  The short-term approach is necessary for 
keeping the selection pressures constant, and this cannot be assumed for long-term 
evolutionary processes.  
 There are two major reasons for the long-term change of selection pressures. 
First, selection pressures change with the changing size of the population. As long 
as the population is small compared to the carrying capacity of its environment, 
selection favours units that are quick in exploiting the possibilities. But as the 
population grows, the selection changes to favour units that are finely tuned to 
survive in a crowded environment. Second, the environment is to a large extent 
composed of other populations. In the long-term there is a co-evolution between 
the different populations, and this obviously co-evolution obviously changes 
selection pressures. For instance, an industry is competing and collaborating with 
other industries, and this interaction is changing over time. To handle both forms 
of density-dependent evolution, we need inter-population thinking. But this form 
of thinking is not directly supported by Price’s approach. The delimitation of this 
approach should, however, be considered a useful feature and not a failure of the 
approach since it separates clearly the study of sort-term issues from the study of 
long-term issues. Thereby it serves to emphasise the urgent need for developing 
complementary tools for the study of long-term evolutionary change. 
 The paper starts in section 2 by applying a basic heuristic from economic 
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folklore: it can all be found in Marshall. This is certainly true with respect to 
population thinking. But Marshall never fully developed this part of his thinking, 
so we have reconstruct it—e.g. from his famous analogy of the trees of a virgin 
forest and his account for industrial districts. These ideas can easily be expanded 
to cover all the different forms of population thinking. The core of the paper deals 
with these forms and the related tools. First we in section 3 deal with basic intra-
population analysis for single populations, and this is followed up in section 4 by a 
short treatment of how this analysis can be extended to structured populations, 
where selection takes place at several levels. Then we in section 5 deal with the 
issues of co-evolution of populations and in section 6 with the emergence of new 
populations. Finally some conclusions are drawn. Thus, the ambition of the paper 
is to give a broad coverage of the forms of evolutionary thinking and the related 
tools. 
2. Expanding Marshall’s fable of the trees 
In order to master evolutionary analysis, we have to overcome a trees-or-wood 
problem. On the one hand, we have to avoid the danger of not being able to see the 
evolving wood for all its constituent trees. For instance, each firm is unique and 
has its own environment, so it is not obvious how to delineate an ‘industry’ that is 
common to a set of firms. However, since evolution is a characteristic of a 
population rather than its individual members, this firm-oriented view means that 
we have dropped evolution. If we, on the other hand, emphasise the aggregate 
population, there us a danger of not being able to see the trees for the wood. We 
may, for instance, consider an industry as an aggregate, but then industrial 
evolution becomes a mysterious phenomenon with no micro foundation. 
Population thinking overcomes the trees-or-wood problem by emphasising that 
the evolution of the aggregate characteristics of the wood is the outcome of 
mutation and selection of individual trees. Thus, the long-term emergence of an 
increased biomass per acre of woodland is the combined result of the emergence 
of trees with new productivity characteristics and the selection of trees that have 
supernormal productivities. Similarly, we may see market selection against firms 
with low productivity. However, to be sure that a population-level productivity 
increase is really due to evolution, we need to keep constant the age composition 
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of the population. Otherwise, the productivity increase may just be due to the 
intrinsic productivity increase caused by the maturation of trees, or firms, as they 
grow larger. This will typically be the case in a forest after a large windfall and in 
a young industry.  But in a large forest we will normally see the emergence of an 
equilibrated size distribution. This is the moral of Marshall’s (1961, 315 f.) fable 
of the trees:  
[W]e may read a lesson from the young trees of the forest as they struggle upwards 
through the benumbing shade of their older rivals. Many succumb on the way, and a 
few only survive; those few become stronger with every year, they get a larger share of 
light and air with every increase of their height, and at last in their turn they tower 
above their neighbours, and seem as though they would grow on for ever, and for ever 
become stronger as they grow. But they do not. One tree will last longer in full vigour 
and attain a greater size than another; but sooner or later age tells on them all. Though 
the taller ones have a better access to light and air than their rivals, they gradually lose 
vitality; and one after another they give place to others, which, though of less material 
strength, have on their side the vigour of youth. 
 This famous quotation prepares the ground for the definition of a stationary 
forest, where we have forest-level equilibrium although no single tree is in 
equilibrium. Thus, such a stationary forest is ‘full of movement’ (p. 367), we may 
ignore the effect of the developmental mechanism since the age and size 
distributions do not change. We may even resolve the trees-or-forest problem by 
studying a single representative tree. This notion has an obvious meaning if all 
trees (or firms) are of equal size (p. 367): 
Of course we might assume that in our stationary state every business remained always 
of the same size, and with the same trade connection. But we need not go so far as that; 
it will suffice to suppose that firms rise and fall, but that the ‘representative’ firm 
remains always of about the same size, as does the representative tree of a virgin 
forest, and that therefore the economies resulting from its own resources are constant[.] 
 Although this stationary forest allows an abstraction from the developmental 
mechanism, it is still under influence of the evolutionary mechanism. Through this 
mechanism, many characteristics of the representative tree will change over time. 
This change may imply an increased size—like in the evolutionary arms race that 
has produced giant sequoia trees from herbs—but it also influences many other 
characteristics of the trees. Similarly, Marshall envisages that the representative 
firm transforms from a family firm to a corporation. 
 Marshal does not explore these evolutionary aspects of his version of the fable 
of the trees. The reason is that this fable is placed centrally in Marshall’s (1961) 
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Principles of Economics, where he presents what I shall call the mechanical 
Marshall Mark I model of economic life. But both the developmental and the 
evolutionary mechanisms point beyond this model towards the ‘biological’ or 
evolutionary Marshall Mark II models, which were intended for the never 
published volume 2 of the Principles. So it is relevant to speculate about an 
expansion of the fable of the trees for evolutionary purposes, and it is not too 
difficult since Marshall filled his published volume with evolutionary thinking and 
presented additional suggestions in other works (Raffaeli, 2003; Arena and Quéré, 
2003). These suggestions clearly demonstrate that the fable of the trees was 
designed as a bridge: it allowed the introduction of the concepts of equilibrium and 
the representative firms needed by Marshall Mark I, but it also allowed the further 
intra-population thinking of Marshall Mark II. 
 The present paper has no room for a reconstruction of Marshall Mark II, but 
several aspects of his evolutionary thinking are obvious enough to suggest an 
expansion of his version of the fable of the trees. From the very beginning is 
should, however, be remarked that Marshall was in serious lack of adequate 
analytical tools—even in handling a simplified version of his evolutionary 
equilibrium. Although Marshall (1961, 460 f.) excluded ‘substantive new 
inventions’ and only covered ‘those which may be expected to arise naturally out 
of adaptations of existing ideas’ and the developmental ‘forces of progress and 
decay’, he had to emphasise that 
... such notions must be taken broadly. The attempt to make them precise over-reaches 
our strength. If we include in our account nearly all the conditions of real life, the 
problem is to heavy to be handled; if we select a few, then long-drawn-out and subtle 
reasonings with regard to them becomes scientific toys rather than engines for practical 
work. 
 These and other formulations demonstrate both Marshall’s lack of analytical 
tools and his unwillingness to publish his preliminary attempts with ‘scientific 
toys’. The present expansion of the fable of the trees serves to reveal some of these 
difficulties and start a search for reduced-form problems and ‘scientific toys’ to 
opens up the ‘high theme’ of economic evolution. More specifically, the present 
approach to population thinking suggests a decomposition of this theme into four 
sub-themes. Let us briefly consider them in relation to an extension of the fable of 
the trees. 
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 The simple forest fable concentrates on the evolution of a population in a 
homogeneous selection environment. It avoids the developmental story—that was 
emphasised by Marshall—and concentrate on the evolutionary outcome of the 
‘struggle’ between the trees, e.g. with respect to productivity. In principle, we may 
tell such a fable in terms of a representative firm, but to grasp the details of the 
evolutionary process, we need a full account for the distribution of the 
characteristics of the trees. To simplify further, we may just ask what happens 
between two points of time. From an evolutionary viewpoint, this boils down to 
two things. First, the trees that had initially different productivities may have 
shown differential growth rates due to what we shall call selection. Second, the 
individual trees may have mutated or innovated. Evolution in the forest is thereby 
a combination of a selection effect and an innovation effect. This useful analytical 
distinction does not necessarily imply that selection and innovation are 
independent. Thus, we can accommodate to Marshall’s preference for Lamarckian 
learning without excluding less flexible and more ‘Darwinian’ characteristics. We 
can see that this evolutionary story it is not too far from Marshall (1961, 355) from 
his emphasis on variation: 
Every locality has incidents of its own which affect in various ways the methods of 
arrangement of every class of business that is carried out on it : and even in the same 
place and the same trade no two persons pursuing the same aims will adopt exactly the 
same routes. The tendency to variation is a chief course of progress; and the abler are 
the undertakers in any trade the greater will this tendency be ... [I]n minor details the 
variations are numberless. 
Thus, it is obvious that Marshallian competition is not perfect in the modern 
neoclassical sense and that there is plenty of material for the competitive struggle 
between the trees.  
 The clustered forest fable tries to grasp Marshall’s interest for industrial 
clustering (Marshall, 1961, Part IV, Ch. 10) in the simplest possible way. 
Although we, basically, stick to the story of a population in a homogeneous 
selection environment, we add the fact that near-by trees may influence each other 
in a positive way. In this setting, it is possible that a group of neighbouring trees 
takes over the whole forest.  If for random reasons a group of strong trees lives 
near to each other, they may create a local environment that is favourable for both 
their own growth and that of their offspring. Thus, we will have a successful forest 
locality. The question is, of course, why the positive effects do not spread more 
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widely. Here we probably have to include a natural segmentation of the location 
that hinders positive relationships between the clusters although it still allows one 
cluster to overshadow another cluster. As long as we accept this simplified story of 
the clustered forest, we may perform the same decomposition of evolution as for 
the simple forest. If we look at the whole forest, we find a selection effect and an 
‘innovation’ effect. However, if we study the ‘innovation’ effect, we will find that 
some of it is due to the positive and mutual ‘selection’ of near-by trees. This 
‘selection’ will by many evolutionary economists be called innovation, but there is 
a qualitative difference between the environmentally induced ‘innovation’ and the 
rest of the innovation effect. 
 The diversified forest fable brings us closer to both Marshall’s thinking and to 
real forests. Here we operate with a forest composed by a number of different 
species that each form a population and together form a forest ecology. In such an 
ecology the different species are collaborating and competing in a very complex 
manner. For this reason we often concentrate on a single species while holding all 
other species constant. This is, of course, what Marshall did through the ceteris 
paribus clause of his partial equilibrium analysis (and what we implicitly have 
done in the fables of simple and clustered forests). Alternatively, we may like 
many ecologists study the interaction between species with unchanging 
characteristics. But in both cases we exclude the co-evolution between the 
different populations of trees.  The purpose of the diversified forest fable is to 
overcome this exclusion of evolution without making the analysis unmanageable 
by including too many details. One strategy is to concentrate on the evolutionary 
relationship between one focal species and another species. There are many 
examples of cooperative evolution both in Marshall’s general account for the inter-
industrial division of labour and in his specific discussion of industrial districts, 
but the diversified jungle also includes a great many relationships that are partially 
competitive. In both cases, the first task is to understand how the relationship 
influences evolution within the focal species. Then we may turn our interest to 
evolution within the other species, and finally we might grasp the long-term co-
evolution of the two species. To understand the whole network of co-evolutionary 
relationships is, of course, much harder. Even to keep the image of an evolving 
diversified forest in mind seems nearly impossible. 
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 The diversifying forest fable is analytically somewhat more tractable. Here the 
task is to grasp how new species emerge in any forest. Thus, we may start from a 
simple forest with a single species and study how a new species emerge in such a 
forest. In general, such an emergence takes place by finding an unexploited or 
underexploited niche in the forest. Due to Marshall’s deep interest in the 
increasing inter-firm division of labour, many of his niches imply symbiotic 
relationships to existing species. Let us consider parts of his long account for the 
emerging division of labour in the printing industry. Here Marshall (1961, 259) 
apparently starts from scratch: 
Everyone is familiar with the pioneer newspaper editor of newly settled districts of 
America, who sets up the type of his articles as he composes them; and with the aid of 
a boy prints off his sheets and distributes them to his scattered neighbours. When 
however the mystery of printing was new, the printer had to do all this for himself, and 
in addition to make all his own appliances. These are now provided for him by 
separate ‘subsidiary’ trades, from whom even the printer in the backwoods can obtain 
everything that he wants to use. But in spite of the assistance which it thus gets from 
outside, a large printing establishment has to find room for many different classes of 
workers within its walls. 
The emphasis is here on two different situations for diversification. In the Wild 
West, we find a situation that appears well suited for the creation of new auxiliary 
species, but such species are already available due to the long-term evolution of 
printing. Thus, it is at the location where the new niche first becomes sufficiently 
large for a new species that it is most likely to emerge. This process of niche 
formation continues in the centres of growth of the printing industry, and Marshall 
is able to list many specialities. His division-of-labour approach, however, only 
covers some of the ways in which diversification of populations takes place, and 
he hardly provides any analytical tools for handling the process. 
 The four versions of the fable of the trees may be a good way of grasping some 
of the evolutionary problems that Marshall faced but never treated systematically. 
They, furthermore, give us a logical ordering of the tasks of evolutionary 
economic analysis—from the simpler to the more complex. But they do not hide 
the fact that Marshall gave up his attempts to formalise his evolutionary images. 
This question is whether modern evolutionary economics is able to move from 
fables and population thinking to systematic evolutionary analysis. In other words, 
are we today able to overcome the difficulties that a skilled economist and 
mathematician like Marshall could not handle? 
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3. The simple forest: Intra-population thinking 
The breakthrough came with the Genetical Theory of Natural Selection by the 
geneticist and statistician R. A. Fisher (1999), who may be called the founding 
father of the statistical analysis of intra-population evolution (and of much of 
modern statistics!). Among his results, we shall concentrate on what may be called 
the Fisher principle (Metcalfe, 1998, Ch. 2). It is a generalised version of Fisher’s 
(1999, 46) statement that ‘[t]he rate of increase of fitness of any species is equal to 
the genetic variance in fitness’. ’ If we study a step-wise evolutionary process, we 
may reformulate his theorem in discrete terms. Let iw  be the fitness of an 
individual unit (organism), w the mean fitness of the population and w∆  the 
change in mean fitness. Furthermore, let Var( )iw  be the population’s variance of 
fitness (the reason for the non-standard subscript will become clear in section 3). 
Then the Fisher theorem says that 
 Var( ).iw w∆ =  (1) 
 This theorem describes a distance-from-mean dynamics, where the 
representation of a unit at the end of the period (its offspring) is determined by its 
relative fitness. Units with above-average fitness will increase their weight in the 
population, while units with below-average fitness have decreasing weight. The 
change in mean fitness is thus determined by the variance of unit-level fitness in 
the beginning of the period under study. Apparently, Fisher’s theorem (1) is only 
about biological evolution, but his general formulation of selection and his 
inspiration from thermodynamics secured its general applicability. Thus general 
applicability may be emphasised by talking about the Fisher Principle (Metcalfe, 
1994; 1998, Ch. 2), which serves as a starting point for the formalisation of 
population thinking. Especially, it helps us to recognise the enormous importance 
of statistical concepts—both in evolutionary theory and in the empirical study of 
evolution. 
Fisher’s work started—like the work of e.g. Nelson and Winter (1982)—from 
statistics of populations and their change. The Fisher theorem states that if 
selection favours the degree to which a particular property/trait is present in the 
individuals, then the rate of change of the mean value of this property is 
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proportional to the variance of the property within the population. Thus, we have 
to define the properties that are selected for, measure their variance, study the 
strength of the selective forces, and follow the consequences at the aggregate 
population level. It is, however, important not to make this analysis in terms of a 
pure selection process. By doing so we ignore that the change in the property is not 
only due to selection but also to other causes of improvement and deterioration. 
This problem was mentioned by Fisher, but since it was not included in his formal 
analysis, it has much too often been forgotten. Metcalfe (1998) suggests that we 
should emphasise the Fisher principle (which includes the broader issues) rather 
than the narrow Fisher theorem. This task is, however, solved elegantly by G. R. 
Price, who was also the co-founder of evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith 
and Price, 1973). 
To overcome some of the ambiguities of Fisher’s formulation of his theorem, 
Price (1970; 1972a) made a decomposition of the evolutionary change that 
included not only the effect of selection but also the effect of causes that increase 
variation. Price’s equation (or formula) is not easy to understand, so even though it 
resolves many of Fisher’s problems, it is often used in a delimited version is of 
less importance. Frank (1995; 1997; 1998) has been a major contributor to the 
development and diffusion of the full version of Price’s decomposition of 
evolutionary change. His contributions demonstrate that a large number of 
evolutionary problems can be clarified by means of Price’s equation. They also 
make clear that many researchers have been moving in the same direction as Price 
without noticing the full generality of their results and their relationship to Price. 
This fact is emphasised by Metcalfe (2002, 90) ‘For some years now evolutionary 
economists have been using the Price equation without realising it.’ This statement 
holds for Metcalfe’s (1998; 2001) own important contributions to theoretical 
evolutionary economics, but it has also some truth for Nelson and Winter’s (1982) 
pioneering contributions to evolutionary economics. A few have made the same 
discovery as Metcalfe. Thus, several game theorists have begun to apply Price’s 
equation (cf. Gintis, 2000, 267–268), and Knudsen (2002) have used both the 
equation and Price’s general account for selection to rethink the role of habits and 
routines in theories of economic evolution. 
To illustrate the functioning of Price’s form of intra-population thinking, it is 
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easiest to deal with an evolutionary process that moves in discrete steps—like 
agricultural production, where a new generation of output is brought to the market 
every year. Most evolutionary games and most neo-Schumpeterian models are of 
this type. For such cases, it is possible to make a simple analysis of evolutionary 
change from one period to another period. The same analysis can actually be 
applied to any discrete-step evolutionary process in biology, economics, and 
elsewhere. This analysis appears very different from the widespread approach of 
replicator equations (Silverberg, 1988; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), where we 
study the change of population shares of (groups of) agents with different 
properties, but the two approaches are actually complementary (Page and Nowak, 
2002). However, the present discussion follows Fisher and Price in concentrating 
on the change of the mean of a property of the population.  
In the case of the simplest evolutionary version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game the obvious property is the strategy. Here we study the frequency of players 
with the cooperative strategy in the two periods and find the change in this 
frequency. Similarly, we may take the Nelson–Winter model in which we measure 
the mean productivity in the population of firms in the two periods and calculate 
the change in this mean productivity. Price’s equation may also be used on data 
collected from a real population of firms or households. Presently we, however, 
shall work with simple models. 
 When we try to explain the evolution of a mean characteristic, we have the 
problem that it might be caused by many forces. It is, nevertheless, possible to 
decompose the change in the mean characteristic into two effects of which at least 
the first (the selection effect) is easy to understand. The second (which in this 
paper is called the innovation effect) is more difficult to grasp since its meaning 
depends on the type of evolution under study. However, a partitioning into these 
two effects is possible for any evolutionary change, so it may e.g. be applied to 
change in an evolutionary game or in the Nelson–Winter model. For these and any 
other evolutionary process, Price’s equation states that  
 Total change Selection effect 'Innovation' effect.= +  
This verbal description of Price’s equation gives a first impression of the elements 
of evolutionary change, but it cannot be fully understood without a little formal 
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analysis. To decompose evolutionary change we need a study the individual 
members of a population a two points of time, where we denote variable values for 
the first period with their ordinary names and variable values for the second period 
by adding primes. The members that we study can either be individuals or groups 
of individuals. To perform the analysis, we need to operate in terms of several 
variables for both these members and the aggregate population. Let us gradually 
move through these variables before we restate the verbal equation in formal 
terms. 
For each member of the population we need to obtain information on four 
variables. The first is the characteristic value iz . In the simple Nelson–Winter 
model iz  is the productivity of a firm’s capital stock. The second variable is the 
change of this productivity between the two periods iz∆ . The third variable is the 
population share si. In the Nelson–Winter model—where the underlying 
population may be said to consist of machines—this variable is a firm’s capital 
share is . The fourth variable is the reproduction coefficient iw , which is simply 
one plus the growth rate. If we multiply the first-period size of a member by its 
reproduction coefficient, we obtain the size in the next period. Given this 
information about the members of the population, we study additional population-
level information in order to explain the change of the mean productivity z∆ . 
Table 1: Core statistics. 
Variable Description Definition 
is  population share of entity i  
z mean value of characteristic 
i is z∑  
Var( )iz  variance of characteristics 2( )i is z z−∑  
w mean reproduction coefficient 
i is w∑  
Cov( , )i iw z  covariance of reproduction coefficients and characteristics ( )( )i i is w w z z− −∑  
( , )i iw zβ  regression of reproduction coefficients on characteristics 
Cov( , ) / Var( )i i iw z z  
E( )i iw z∆  expected value of change in characteristics in the end population i i is w z∆∑  
 
 To study the selection effect we need basic population-level statistics (see table 
1). Here it is useful to start from the regression coefficient of reproduction on 
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productivity, which in this paper is denoted by ( , )i iw zβ . This regression 
coefficient shows the degree to which selection exploits differential productivities. 
Normally we deal with partial regression coefficients, but in the present discussion 
we shall operate as if productivity is the only determinant of the reproduction 
coefficient. Thus its meaning can be caught by considering the linear relationship 
 ( , ) error.i i i iw w z zα β= + +  
The next population variable is the variance of the productivities Var( )iz . The 
variance describes the differences on which selection operates. If Var( ) 0iz = , 
selection cannot produce any change of mean productivity. Given non-zero values 
of both the regression coefficient and the variance, we have a contribution to 
observed change of mean productivity. The information on the regression 
coefficient and the variance may be replaced by the covariance between 
reproduction coefficients and productivities Cov( , ) ( , )Var( )i i i i iw z w z zβ= . 
Following Price, we may simply define selection in terms of this covariance (see 
below). 
 The study of the innovation effect starts from firm-level change in productivity 
iz∆ . The effect of this change on mean productivity is dependent on the firms’ 
capacity shares in the second period, so we need to introduce the reproduction 
coefficients (since /i i is s w w′ = ). The total size of the effect is the mean or the 
expected value of all the firm-level contributions to the innovation effect, i.e. 
E( )i iw z∆ . According to this definition of ‘innovation’, we are obviously dealing 
with change in productivity that may occur for a variety of reasons. Thus the 
innovation effect of evolutionary economics comprises innovation in the ordinary 
sense, imitation, learning, etc. 
 Given the above definitions, we can readily understand the two elements of 
Price’s decomposition of evolutionary change with respect to e.g. a Nelson–Winter 
model. Price’s equation states that mean productivity change 
 Cov( , ) E( ) ( , )Var( ) E( ) .i i i i i i i i iw z w z w z z w zz
w w w w
β∆ ∆∆ = + = +  (2) 
Equation (2) is an identity. Given some experience in elementary statistics, the 
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derivation is fairly simple (see Andersen, 2003b). The fact that Price’s equation is 
an identity means that it holds for any change in a characteristic, and thus also for 
productivity change. 
 It is often convenient to formulate Price’s equation in a slightly modified 
version, where 
 
Selection effect Innovation effect
Cov( , ) E( ).i i i iw z w z w z∆ = + ∆
 
 (3) 
Here the left hand side describes the change in characteristic weighted by the mean 
reproduction coefficient of the population. In this case, the definition of the 
selection effect and the imitation effect is particularly simple. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the left hand side is structurally similar to the contents of the 
expectation term ( i iw z∆ ). This means that Price’s equation can be used to expand 
itself (see section 4). 
 Equation (3) shows that short-term evolutionary change of e.g. productivity is 
determined by two effects. The first is the selection effect that exploits the 
weighted variance of the productivities. If this variance is large, then mean 
productivity may increase quickly. The effectiveness of this selection is influenced 
by the degree to which the relative reproduction coefficients of firms reflect their 
productivities, and this degree is measured by linear regression as we have already 
discussed. Thus, selection efficiency is an empirical question that we have to 
confront for each time step of the evolutionary process. The second effect is the 
innovation effect. To see why this name is appropriate in the Nelson–Winter 
context, we have to consider the meaning of E( )i iw z∆ . If there is no change in the 
productivity of any of the individual firms, then the sum is zero. Why should 
productivity change at the firm level be different from zero? There are, of course, 
many potential reasons for both negative and positive values, but in the present 
context we shall concentrate of the knowledge issue. Here productivity change 
may be positive because of innovation, imitation or learning processes. It might be 
negative because the firm does not have an effective system of reproduction of its 
knowledge. The expected aggregate effects of both learning and forgetting are, of 
course, influenced by the capacity shares of the firms. 
 In specific cases, Price’s equation (3) may be simplified. If we study pure 
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selection processes, the innovation effect is zero. This is obviously what is 
assumed to derive Fisher’s theorem (1). To see the connection to Price’s equation, 
we observe that the evolving characteristic is the reproduction coefficients 
themselves. Thus Fisher’s theorem can be derived from the Price equation in the 
following way: 
 Cov( , ) Var( ).i i iw w w w w∆ = =  
Hereby it is emphasised that Fisher is operating in relative terms, i.e. he works 
with Var( / )iw w . Furthermore, the selection process means that the variance taken 
in the first period is less than the variance we found for the second period. The 
reason is both due to the movement of mean productivity and changes in capacity 
shares: firms below the mean have become smaller while the mean has moved 
closer to the firms that increase their capacity share. If the regression coefficient is 
constant, then we will see a decrease in productivity change between the two 
periods. To avoid the ‘retardation of change’ we need to switch on the innovation 
effect. This not only gives a short-term effect on mean productivity change. It also 
provides new variance with which the selection mechanism can work. 
 Nelson and Winter made a similar study of a pure selection process—although 
they were explicitly working in terms of an evolving characteristic. On this 
background it is not surprising that they obtained the same result—in a somewhat 
roundabout manner.1 By means of Price’s equation the result is directly obtained. 
For all pure selection processes we find that the change of a characteristic than 
influences fitness is proportional to the variance of that characteristic. We also find 
that the selection process means that the variance in the first period is less than the 
variance we find for the second period. The reason is both due to the movement of 
mean productivity and changes in capacity shares: firms below the mean have 
become smaller while the mean has moved closer to the firms that increase their 
capacity share. To avoid the slowdown of change we need to switch on the 
innovation effect. This not only gives a short-term effect on mean productivity 
                                                 
1 In a footnote Nelson and Winter (1982, 243) remarked that an ‘... analogue for Fisher’s theorem 
in the present model is the proposition that the rate of reduction in industry average unit costs is 
equal to the share-weighted cross-sectional unit cost. This proposition is indeed a theorem under 
the assumptions of the present model, a fact we were led to verify by the parallel with Fisher’s 
result’ 
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change. It also provides new variance with which the selection mechanism can 
work in future periods. The same problem emerges in productivity studies like 
those reviewed by Bartelsman and Doms (2000). To compare the increasing 
number of studies that are based on longitudinal microdata, the authors emphasise 
a partitioning of aggregate productivity that has great similarity with, and are 
easily rewritten to, Price’s equation. The advantage of doing so is that the 
evaluation of the data becomes immediately connected to core results of 
evolutionary economics. 
An obvious application of Price’s equation is to follow what happens in the 
evolution of the somewhat more complex Nelson–Winter model of Schumpeterian 
competition. If we start with many equal-sized firms, and if different productivities 
have already emerged, then there is a rather strong selection effect. This selection 
effect is, however, influenced by the rate of depreciation of capital. It reaches a 
maximum with a depreciation rate of unity, where all production in the next period 
is made by new capital. As the industry becomes more concentrated, the selection 
effect becomes weaker. The reason is that firms with large market shares show 
monopolistic investment restraint. For such firms a large productivity gain may 
even lead to negative investment. The reason is that these firms maximise their 
profits in this way, but this also mean that they some of the productivity 
differentials are not used to increase mean productivity of the industry. In these 
and other ways, Price’s equation allows a quick analysis of the aggregate 
behaviour of Schumpeterian competition. 
4. The clustered forest: Multi-level population thinking 
Although the above presentation of Price’s equation has primarily related to the 
evolution of industrial populations, this formula is an identity that can be used for 
the study of any kind of change in which selection has a role to play. The 
decomposition may also deal with more structured populations than an industry in 
which every firm competes directly against any other firm. Actually, Price’s 
formula has found a primary area of use for the study of structured populations. 
The reason is that both in studies of biological and cultural evolution it has become 
obvious that the formula suggests an easy and general way to handle populations 
that have both a group level and an individual level. Thus it functions as a major 
 
20 
tool for the study of social evolution—no matter whether ‘social’ relates to ants of 
humans and whether social behaviour is influences by genes, culture or economic 
institutions (cf. Frank, 1998). 
In the first 15 years of its existence, Price’s formula found few applications 
(Grafen, 1985, 38), but after that time it has won fairly widespread applications 
among evolutionary biologists and, more recently, among some evolutionary game 
theorists in economics (Gintis, 2000, Ch. 11). It is especially Frank (1998) that has 
demonstrated the broad applicability and the unifying power of Price’s formula. 
For instance, it has in biology served to obtain a certain degree of reconciliation 
between the majority view of individual-level selection and the minority view that 
emphasises group-level selection (Sober and Wilson, 1998; Gould, 2002, Ch. 8). 
Hitherto, group-level selection has largely been used to explain the biological and 
cultural evolution of ‘altruistic’ behaviour that seems to be a necessity for the 
functioning of human societies. However, given that ‘altruism’ is a potential of 
Homo sapiens in small to medium-sized groups, then the group-level analysis may 
also help to explain several aspects of business organisation and the functioning of 
localised groups of firms. 
 Group-level analysis may be applied to the study of any population that are 
partitioned in a nested way. Take, for instance, the productivity studies reviewed 
by Bartelsman and Doms (2000). Here the plant is often taken as the unit of 
selection, but plants are connected to firms, and firms are often connected to 
national economies within the global economy. Thus we have to deal with 
selection of plants within firms, selection of firms within national economics, and 
selection of national economies within the global economy. Since the national 
level is increasingly blurred due to transnational firms, we might have to make 
separate studies of the selection of plants within firms and the selection of plants 
within national economies. But irrespectively of our partitioning of the overall 
system, there is an obvious need to study the different kinds of selection that takes 
place at the different levels. 
 Let us start with Marshall’s (1949, Part IV, Ch. 10) well-known theory of 
industrial districts. This theory was based in the commonplace observation that 
many English cities and geographical areas were highly specialised around the 
production of a small set of goods and that they upheld this specialisation over 
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long time spans. It is possible to apply two-level population thinking to analyse 
this phenomenon. To simplify we consider only a single industry of a competitive 
economy. We assume that this population can be decomposed into sub-
populations, each of which lives in an industrial district. Thus, we have an industry 
that is structured into districts (indexed by i) that consist of firms (indexed by ij). 
To explore the functioning of such industrial districts, we shall start by expressing 
Price’s equation for the group level of the population—like the districts. Thus we 
now interpret equation (3) as dealing with industrial districts within a national 
economy. This means that 
 , and .i ij ij i ij ij i ij ijw s w z s z z s z= = ∆ = ∆∑ ∑ ∑  
 Given this interpretation, it is obvious that we may apply Price’s equation (3) to 
the evolution that takes place within the industrial districts. For each district we 
find that 
 
Intra-district selection effect Intra-firm innovation effect
Cov( , ) E( ).i i ij ij ij ijw z w z w z∆ = + ∆
 
 (4) 
If we insert equation (4) into equation (3) and split the overall expectation term, 
we find that 
 
Inter-district selection effect Intra-district selection effect Intra-firm innovation effect
Cov( , ) E(Cov( , )) E(E( )).i i ij ij ij ijw z w z w z w z∆ = + + ∆
  
(5) 
If we compare equation (5) with equation (3), we see that what was at the level of 
industrial districts considered an innovation effect is now partitioned into the 
expectation of the selection effects within the districts and the expectation of the 
more narrowly defined innovation effect within the firms. In other words, we study 
change of mean productivity at the national level in terms of three effects. First, 
there is selection between the districts of the industry. Here we can either directly 
use the covariance between district reproduction coefficients and district 
productivities or use the formulation with the regression coefficient and the 
variance of district productivities. Second, there is the expected value of the intra-
district selection effects. If the mean of these effects is significant, it is due to the 
differences in the selection process in different districts. Third, there is the 
expected value of the innovation effects—first over firms and then over districts. 
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Until now, the grouping of firms has been attached to districts, and they may 
show up to have importance. But the grouping can be made in the most arbitrary 
way. For instance, we may apply Price’s formula to groups defined by the first 
letter of the names of the firms. Thus, there must surely be many insignificant 
ways of grouping firms. The best is, of course, to use groupings to test theories. So 
the question is which kind of theory we should apply. Here the example of 
industrial districts points to Marshall’s theory, but to cover broader issues we shall 
instead turn to theories of the evolution of cooperation. Such theories have not 
least been developed in evolutionary game theory—both in its formal version and 
in its computer-simulation-oriented version. 
Another kind of theories that may be explored by multi-level population 
analysis have been developed in evolutionary game theory—both in its formal 
version and in its computer-simulation-oriented version. Let us think of the latter 
and start from Axelrod’s (1990; 1997) work, which at an early point included 
collaboration with one of the most important researchers on social behaviour in 
biology (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; see also Hamilton, 1996). According to this 
approach, social life is seen as a series of Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Here it is 
possible to collaborate and obtain a welfare gain, but the temptation to exploit a 
collaborator means that the dominant strategy is to defect. Since this holds for both 
players, the result is that no welfare gain is obtained. The apparent solution is to 
introduce repeated games, where each player remembers previous games and 
punish defectors (the tit-for-tat strategy). Unfortunately, this solution is fragile to 
errors and misunderstandings. Social life, furthermore, is hardly stable enough to 
make the tit-for-tat solution feasible in medium-sized or large populations. Instead 
the solution seems to be to consider social life as structured into groups that in 
some way or another exclude many defectors and where collaboration is so 
productive that the effects of the actions of the collaborators outweigh the negative 
influence of remaining defectors. 
The analysis of this solution can be handles by Price’s equation, from which 
we for convenience exclude the innovation effect. To prepare for the Price 
decomposition we define z as the frequency of collaborators in the overall 
population. Thus 1 z−  is the frequency of defectors. Furthermore, we define the 
reproduction coefficient of a player with a given strategy in the first period as the 
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number of players (including himself) that have been persuaded to follow the 
strategy in the next period. This number is determined by the relative payoff of the 
strategy. In an unstructured population, the payoff of collaboration is defined to be 
below that of defectors, so it will die off. So what about a population structured in 
groups? Equation (5) holds for each group and the innovation effect is equal to 
zero. Thus we have that 
 
Inter-group selection effect Intra-group selection effect
Cov( , ) E(Cov( , ).ij ij ij ijw z w z w z∆ = +
 
 (6) 
If we in equation (6) move w to the right hand side, we see that the equation is 
about change of frequency of collaborators in the overall population. This change 
is influenced by two effects. Take first the expectation term: the intra-group 
selection effect on the frequency of collaborators. This effect must be negative as 
long as there are mixed groups. To see this, remember that Cov = βVar . Consider 
the contributions to the variance group by group. In homogeneous groups (either 
collaborators or defectors), variance is zero. Given the assumptions of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the regression coefficient has to work against collaborators. 
So the intra-group selection effect is negative as long as there are mixed groups. 
Furthermore, any unprotected group of collaborators can be taken over by 
defectors. 
In order to avoid that collaborators are driven out of the overall population, the 
inter-group selection effect must be positive, i.e. there must be a positive 
regression coefficient of reproduction on the frequency of collaborators at this 
level. Furthermore, the effect must be sufficient to outweigh the negative intra-
group selection. Thus  
 Cov( , ) E(Cov( , )).i i ij ijw z w z> −  
The mechanism here is that a group’s mean payoff increases as the number of 
collaborators increases. Thus, although the relative number of collaborators 
decreases in mixed groups, the absolute number of collaborators may increase 
because their groups increase significantly more than average. 
Our simple analysis based on Price’s equation does not allow a broader study 
of the problems involved in upholding a high frequency of collaborators in a 
population that interact according to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is, however, 
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obvious that the situation can be improved significantly of collaborators have the 
possibility of largely playing with other collaborators. One strategy for securing 
this is ‘altruistic punishment’ (Gintis, 2000, 271–278). This strategy implies that 
altruists punish defectors at a personal cost, while the benefit is gained by the 
group as a whole. Such punishment may imply that it does not pay to be a 
defector. But how can it pay to be such a kind of altruist? Price’s equation tells us 
so—if we reinterpret A as the frequency of this kind of altruists. Computer 
simulations appear to demonstrate that this mechanism might have been working 
for the altruistic propensities of humans (Boyd et al., 2003), but in the present 
context, it is more interesting to know whether we have an evolutionary 
mechanism that explains many of the phenomena of economic organisation. This 
seems indeed to be the case. 
5. The diversified forest: Inter-population thinking 
In the preceding sections, we have explored formal intra-population thinking and 
stretched it to its multi-level limits. But the analysis of evolutionary processes also 
requires that we are able to handle the interaction between different industries by 
means of inter-population thinking. For instance, we would like to know how a 
population of firms co-evolve with its customer population and how the 
functioning is of broad networks of co-evolutionary relationships between 
populations. Unfortunately, the requited form of thinking is more complex and less 
supported by formal tools than intra-population thinking. But this caveat should 
not lead to an abandonment of the study of crucial forms of economic evolution 
through the sole reliance on an evolutionary version of Marshall’s partial 
equilibrium method. Instead, we should confront co-evolution, and thereby we 
might even find that some of the more narrow tools are of great help. This has 
been demonstrated by e.g. Saviotti (1996; 2001) within the tradition of 
evolutionary replicator dynamic analysis. In relation to the present paper it should, 
however, be pointed out that the complementary tradition based on Price’s formula 
has been able to exploit its generality to handle aspects of surprisingly difficult 
issues. 
The first thing to note is that interactions between populations are normally 
handled by formal tools that have a family relationship with replicator dynamics: 
 
25 
the Lotka–Volterra equations for interacting populations (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 
1998, Part 1).  But this tool was originally designed for dealing with the interaction 
between homogeneous populations. Thus, it was a non-evolutionary tool that has 
often been connected with typological thinking. This holds both for its economic 
and biological applications. Thereby the ‘ecological’ tradition was in sharp 
contrast with the intra-population tradition in both biology and economics, which 
has for a long time been based in evolutionary population thinking. This difference 
has, however, been bridged by evolutionary ecology (e.g. Pianka, 1999), which in 
the social sciences is e.g. covered by Hannan and Freeman (1989) and Carroll and 
Hannan (1999).  
Even though the original differences have largely been overcome, there is still 
a serious difference between the two approaches. It concerns the assumptions 
about the density dependence of selection. Here the modern inter-population 
tradition is based on the assumption that the density of a population influences the 
selection among its members, just like the density of one population influences 
selection in other populations. In the evolutionary version of the famous predator–
prey model, selection for many traits increases as an isolated population of prey 
grow toward its carrying capacity, while the density of predators represents a 
varying selection pressure on other traits. The intra-population tradition has 
traditionally abstracted from the density dependence of selection. The reason is 
partly that this tradition is engaged in analysing the selection for many properties 
within a single population. To simplify this analysis it is useful to hold selection 
pressure (e.g. in terms of predators) constant. The analysis of selection for many 
traits is also made easier if their relationships to selection are assumed to be 
additive. Therefore, this tradition tends to dislike complex interactions between 
properties. This is a useful strategy, but it tends to create the opinion that ‘it is a 
bad mistake to think that the Fundamental Theorem actually holds in the real 
world’ (Gintis, 2000, 197). This viewpoint is fully correct and founded in some of 
the deeper problems of the intra-population approach. But as it has been shown 
above there are several problems about the Fisher theorem that can be resolved.  
However, with the help of the work of Frank (1998), Metcalfe (1998; 2001) 
and others, it is possible to avoid much of the controversy that relates to the Fisher 
theorem. First, it is easy to criticise Fisher’s emphasis on variance, but actually he 
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emphasises factors that are now formalised in the second of Price’s effects. 
Second, the emphasis on selection and mutation with respect to a single property 
(here e.g. narrowly defined productivity) has led to the impression that 
evolutionary processes are relatively simple, but this is not the case. Actually, we 
ought to make Price decompositions for each of the huge number of properties that 
are selected for and that determine the (probabilistic) success of firms (and 
organisms). Third, the recursive expansion of Price’s equation demonstrates that 
selection can take place at different levels. Thus, a bridge is created between 
theorists that emphasise ‘individual selection’ and theorists that concentrate on 
‘group selection’. This is done by emphasising that they cannot be taken as 
separate processes and that we can specify the conditions under which the inter-
group selection is more important that the intra-group selection.  
This defence of Price’s version of the Fisher principle is not meant to say that it 
is well suited to handle all aspects of actual evolutionary processes. For instance, 
the introduction of density dependent selection may allow the coexistence of firms 
with different properties and different populations of firms. In the broad version 
Price’s equation does not exclude e.g. density-dependent changes in the regression 
coefficients, but is does little to help us to think about them. The reason is that its 
basic trick here is to emphasise short-term evolutionary change in a more or less 
equilibrated situation. This strategy means that we can remove all the interaction 
effects from our replicator equations. As soon as we turn to long-run evolution, 
this simplification is neither formally correct nor likely to capture the real process 
of economic evolution. This issue is forcefully developed by Frank (1998), but his 
conclusion is that we should try to avoid the complex issues. Instead, he argues for 
the use of comparative static tools, where the major requirement is that 
populations change more quickly than their parameters. This conclusion is, 
however, hardly transferable to evolutionary economics that is still engaged in 
exploring the basic mechanisms of economic evolution.  
 Let us consider the density dependence of the reproduction coefficients iw —
first within a population and then with respect to interacting populations. As 
before populations are denoted by subscript i and the members of the populations 
by ij. For concreteness, we shall relate to the Nelson–Winter model. To get started, 
we shall initially switch off innovation and give all firms the same productivity. 
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Given these assumptions, there is neither a selection effect nor a real innovation 
effect. Thus, Price’s equation (3) tells us that there is no productivity change. 
Nevertheless, the reproduction coefficients may show change from one period to 
the next. To see why, let us measure the size of the population by its capacity—
e.g. the number of machines. Then we make a Price partitioning of the change of 
the mean reproduction coefficient of population i. The total change and the 
individual effects may be denoted 
 selection innovation .i i iw w w∆ = ∆ + ∆  
 To specify the two effects, we simply reapply equation (3), but now we include 
the subscript i to indicate that we are dealing with several populations. Thus, 
 Cov( , ) E( ) Var( ) E( ).i i i i i i i i iw w w w w w w w w∆ = + ∆ = + ∆  (7) 
As earlier, the selection effect of equation (7) is straightforward. But since we 
have assumed that variance is zero, the selection effect is also zero. However, due 
to the explicit treatment of density dependence, we have to reconsider the meaning 
of the second effect. Since by assumption no innovation takes place, the change in 
the population’s mean reproduction coefficient iw∆  is only due to density effects. 
So we may name it the ‘environment effect’ rather than the ‘innovation effect’. 
But since the focus of the present postscript is on innovation, we shall stick to the 
name that is presently so confusing. 
 Seen from the viewpoint of a firm in industry i, its environment consists of 
other firms of the same industry, firms of other industries, and the resources that it 
exploits. To simplify the analysis, we assume that both intra-population 
competition and inter-population competition concern the exploitation of the same 
resource (e.g. a population of customers). This assumption implies that both the 
number of machines in population i ( ix ) and the aggregate number of machines in 
all populations ( x ) contribute to the selection pressure on the individual firm. Let 
us start by considering the situation where population i is alone. In this case, we 
may apply the logistic equation to describe the situation. According to this 
equation, the level of crowding with respect to resource exploitation determines 
the populations’ mean reproduction coefficient. As a small population of machines 
grows larger, crowding reduces the reproduction coefficient until the population 
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reaches unity at the ‘carrying capacity’ of the resource. This is the density effect or 
interaction effect—determined by the squared number of population members. But 
the reproduction coefficient is also influenced by each member’s intrinsic 
capability to grow.  
 The logistic equation applies change rates rather than reproduction coefficients. 
It is also most conveniently expressed in continuous time. It states that the change 
rate of the size of the population 
 d 1 ,d
i i
i i i i i i i
i
x xr x b x x r x
t K
 = − = −  
 (8) 
where /i i iK r b= . In this equation ir  is the maximum reproduction coefficient, 
which is found when iN  is very small. iK  is the steady state size of the 
population, which may be considered as the carrying capacity of the exploited 
resource with respect to population i. When this population size is reached, the 
change rate is zero and the reproduction coefficient is unity. 
 To give evolutionary meaning to the logistic equation (8), we have to remember 
that we are dealing with potentially heterogeneous firms. Thus, differential traits 
may imply that some firms show above-average reproduction coefficients in 
particular situations. When the population of machines is very small, individual 
firms that are organised in a way that allows them to expand quickly will have the 
highest reproduction coefficients. Thus, the frequency of such traits will increase, 
while other traits will be selected out of the industry. This is the r-selection of 
MacArthur and Wilson (2001). This selection regime becomes permanent if the 
population of machines is often reduced in size, and the industry thus has to restart 
its expansion. Otherwise, the population will move toward the carrying capacity of 
the resource, and here K-selection among the firms is predominant. This kind of 
selection favours firms with traits that increase their efficiency in exploiting the 
resource—like firms with quality products or complicated game strategies. 
 The simplest way of moving from the analysis of density dependence within a 
single population to the multi-population case is to assume that the total number of 
members of all populations ( ix x=∑ ) influences the rate of change of each 
individual population. This assumption means that the capacity of all firms from 
all the industries have an equally negative influence on the reproduction 
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coefficient of a particular firm. Thus, we may apply a simplified version of the 
Lotka–Volterra equations. In our simple competitive case, equation (8) only needs 
a minor modification to handle the multi-population case: 
 d 1 .
d
i
i i i i i i
i
x xr x b x x r x
t K
 = − = −  
 (9) 
 Compared with equation (8), the only novelty of equation (9) is that /i ix K  has 
been replaced by / ix K . But the consequence is significant. Now whole industries 
may have an average behaviour that gives them relatively high reproduction 
coefficients when the overall population density is small. But such r-strategy 
industries tend to do gradually more badly as the aggregate population density 
increases. If this expanding exploitation of the resource is not stopped by set-
backs, then it is the relative sizes of the carrying capacities of the industries that 
determines their destiny. If industry A is adapted to r-selection and industry B is 
adapted to K-selection, then AB KK > . This means that when industry A has 
reached a zero change rate, industry B is still expanding. Thus, industry A will start 
to decrease and ultimately it will vanish. If the exploitation of the resource allows 
sufficiently stable populations, only the industry with the highest iK  will survive. 
 This short description of density-dependent selection is based on the relative 
stability of the population parameters ( ir  and iK ), while no such assumption was 
made in Price’s equation (7). Instead, this equation formally presupposes that we 
stick to short-term evolutionary change. In this way, it becomes a universal tool. 
When we move to density dependence and inter-population thinking, we need 
additional and less universal tools. But even here Price’s equation may help to 
clarify the details of the evolutionary process. For instance, studies in terms of the 
logistic equation (8) and the Lotka–Volterra equation (9) tend to consider the 
behavioural variance as absent or given. But in real evolution, the second term of 
Price’s equation (7) is including both an environment effect and an innovation 
effect. Thereby it suggests that the important thing when a set of populations starts 
to reach the individual carrying capacities is not only their given abilities to handle 
this situation. It is probably more important how they innovate. The effect of 
innovation on the change in mean reproduction coefficients will also have an 
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effect on their saturation sizes iK . Thus, it is important to remember that these 
‘parameters’ are really variables. Therefore, we should include into our study the 
changes of the carrying capacities iK∆ . It appears plausible that the industry that 
has the best innovative performance under K-selection will be the one that survive. 
To fixate this issue, it is convenient to call the adaptation to a crowded situation K-
innovation. 
 The short discussion of r-selection and K-selection is in line with the 
postscript’s general preference for simple analytic tools. Such tools tend to clarify 
many discussions and they suggest empirical questions (e.g. the measurement of ir  
and iK in different industries, and the study of K-innovation). But it is, of course, 
important to know whether the simple tools can handle complex issues. 
Ultimately, we have to cope in some way of another with the evolutionary 
consequences of the whole range of inter-industrial relationships. For instance, 
Schumpeter (1939) challenges us to handle the multiple ways in which the so-
called ‘railroadization of the world’ changed economic structure during the 
nineteenth century (cf. Andersen, 2002). Here we obviously cannot perform the 
analysis by means of the truncated version of the Lotka–Volterra equation (9). In 
principle, we have to include the interaction coefficients between a number of 
industries and study the resulting complex dynamics. The question is, however, 
whether the inclusion of the detailed effects of the density of each industry on the 
densities of all the other industries will help us much. For instance, we have to 
drop the idea of using a single density variable like in equation (8), but we have to 
find other simplifications to avoid the analytical problem to become 
unmanageable. Schumpeter’s idea of radical innovations might be the beginning of 
such a tool, but it is hard to see how it can become analytically operational. In the 
more complex setting it also becomes very hard to define iK  and other core parts 
of inter-population thinking. So even when we perform ‘history-friendly 
modelling’ (Malerba et al., 1999), we are forced to make harsh simplifications. 
6. The diversifying forest: Intra-to-inter-population thinking 
In the previous section, we only considered a small subset of the issues of inter-
population thinking. The reason is that the tools that we have considered give 
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insufficient support for this kind of analysis. What is missing is not least an 
understanding of why the different populations exist. To handle this question we 
may turn to intra-to-inter-population thinking. Here we study how and why new 
populations emerge out of old populations. This is a difficult study, and we may 
avoid it by assuming the emergence of new populations by sudden jumps. Such 
jumps characterise Schumpeter’s (1934) theory of evolution based on radical 
innovations. In new growth theory, we find the same approach. Thus, Romer 
(1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) models novelty as new sectors in which 
monopolists produce intermediate goods. Such monopolists produce an increasing 
number of specialised inputs for the final goods sector. But the increasingly 
heterogeneous set of firms does not constitute a population. Instead there is one 
population in the final goods sector, where all firms are identical, and an 
increasing number of intermediate good producing ‘populations’, which each 
consists of one firm. So we are facing inter-population diversity but no intra-
population variance. Furthermore, these firms have ‘rational expectations’ in the 
sense that they know the probability of obtaining an innovation and are able to 
calculate the optimal R&D effort (given that they are risk neutral).  
Both the lack of population thinking in new growth theory and its assumption 
of substantive rationality exclude any analysis of the evolutionary process that in 
real economic life generates much of the observed economic growth. On this 
background it seems premature when Romer (1993, 559) suggests ‘a natural 
division of labour in future research’ between ‘mainstream theorists and 
appreciative theorists’ (p. 556). The former provide ‘simple abstract models’, 
while the latter provide ‘aggregative statistical analysis and in-depth case studies’ 
(p. 559). While Romer’s diagnosis about the deficiencies of the formal tools of 
many theorists of economic evolution might be correct, his prescription has a big 
problem. It ignores the fact that the supposed suppliers of evidence—Romer 
mentions David, Fagerberg, Mokyr, Nelson (1993) and Rosenberg—are dealing 
with heterogeneous populations of boundedly rational agents that are not 
adequately formalised by the new growth theorists (cf. Andersen, 1999, 34–37).  
The activity that that Nelson and Winter (1982, 45–48) call appreciative 
theorising is not least engaged in intra-to-inter-population thinking. Such 
theorising try to specify central facts about cases of economic evolution and then 
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to modify or develop concepts and models that give an adequate account for these 
cases. The purpose is neither to prove the correctness of a given model nor to use 
the model for defining the relevant data. Thus, this approach might seem 
methodologically unsound. Appreciative theorising, however, has an obvious and 
important function: to bridge between abstract formal tools and the tasks and 
practices of empirically oriented industrial economists, economic historians, 
econometricians, etc. Recently, appreciative theorising has taken the form of 
relatively complex and ‘history-friendly’ models that bridge between empirically 
oriented studies and the more abstract models developed in or in relation to Nelson 
and Winter (1982). Malerba et al. (1999, 3–6) argue that while the first generation 
of neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economic models has largely been 
characterised by an attempt to understand the basic logic of evolutionary 
processes, the major challenge presently is to develop a second generation of 
history-friendly models that can be of major help for empirical research in 
economics. This second generation of evolutionary models intends to reflect major 
stylised facts obtained by empirical researchers and that ends up not only by 
‘history-replication’ but also with ‘history-divergent’ simulations. The immediate 
results presented by Malerba et al. (1999) and Malerba and Orsenigo (2001) 
suggest the need of emphasising the role of the diversity of demand, the 
emergence of new technologies and markets, and the role of entry and venture 
capital. Thus, the history-friendly models move from intra-population thinking to 
the more complex forms of population thinking—with an emphasis on what we 
here call intra-to-inter-population thinking. 
While it is correct that intra-population thinking does not sufficiently support 
empirical studies of economic evolution, history-friendly modelling has to apply 
analytic tools that are adapted for intra-to-inter-population thinking. The same was 
the case in evolutionary biology, where the Fisher approach needs a 
complementary approach. Fisher’s approach assumes that evolution takes place in 
huge populations and that sufficient time is available to select out individuals with 
subnormal fitness. Since not even Darwin had such a strong assumptions, Fisher 
may be characterised as a hyper-Darwinian. But his assumptions make it difficult 
to grasp intra-to-inter-population events. In this respect the formal modelling of 
Sewall Wright is much more flexible (Provine, 1986). Wright assumes that a 
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population is placed in a fitness landscape that allows subpopulations with 
different properties emerge, and this assumption makes his approach relevant for 
empirical studies of subpopulations and the emergence of new species, like the 
ones performed by the pioneers of the neo-Darwinian synthesis (Mayr and 
Provine, 1980; Mayr, 1982). Here the properties of new species are not only 
determined by natural selection but also by random drift in small populations and 
by the random properties present in the subpopulations that found new species.  
Underlying these results is the presence of a persistent amount of inheritable 
variance in natural populations, and this heterogeneity has shown to be present in 
empirical studies. Wright’s emphasis on persistent heterogeneity is, however, 
contrary to Fisher’s assumptions, and a Wright–Fisher controversy has been 
important for the development of evolutionary biology. This controversy 
sharpened by Kimura’s theory of neutral evolution, but the study of molecular 
evolution has demonstrated that both sides of the neutralist–selectionist 
controversy have their part of the truth (Page and Homes, 1998, Ch. 7). In 
economic evolution there seems even less ground for a one-sided application of 
Fisher’s assumptions. So Price’s cautious development of the Fisher tradition 
might be of particular importance here. 
 An abstract study of the segmentation of the resources underlying the 
emergence of new populations and the continued existence of multiple populations 
is hardly satisfactory for empirical studies of economic evolution. So there is an 
urgent need to proceed to an economic evolutionary analysis of the most obvious 
source of segmentation in economic life: the division of labour and division of 
knowledge. Here there are two major strategies. The first strategy is to turn 
directly to the diversity of the market environment. The second strategy is to start 
from the inner diversity of the firms and/or households. We shall apply the second 
strategy by starting from multi-activity firms, so the task is to explain why and 
how individual activities become outsourced and coordinated by more-or-less 
clear-cut market mechanisms. Here we relate to the traditions in industrial 
economics and growth theory that trace back to the Smith-inspired ideas of 
Marshall (1961) and Young (1928). As we have already seen in Marshall’s 
account for the printing trade, this tradition focus on the close relationship between 
the internal economies of firms and the external economies that arises from inter-
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firm specialisation with respect to production and knowledge creation. 
 Actually, Marshall’s story of the printing trade is used by Young as an answer 
to the monopoly paradox that arose from Marshall’s allowance into his system of 
economies of scale. There is no real paradox as long as we allow into our models 
the indefinite divisibility of production activities. This divisibility often makes a 
small well-focussed firm more productive than a large firm with a broad scope of 
activities. Although concentration is a real process, the trend is broken by the 
evolution of markets for gradually more intermediate goods that slowly undermine 
many of the industrial giants. Even in relation to such models one might, however, 
ask whether the limits of divisibility will be met ‘at the end of the road’. In a 
Smithian context Richardson’s (1975, 357) answer is ‘that the end of the road may 
never be reached. ... For just as one set of activities was separable into a number of 
components, so each of these in turn become the field for a further division of 
labour.’ The opening up of these possibilities is part of the evolutionary process 
itself: ‘the very process of adaption, by increasing productivity and therefore 
market size, ensures that the adaptation is no longer appropriate to the 
opportunities it has itself created.’ (Richardson, 1975, 358) 
 Let us reconsider Price’s equation (3). Now we are dealing with mean 
productivity change with respect to the ith intermediate goods sector (Andersen, 
forthcoming). Before exchange has emerged in this sector, all producers of final 
output are engaged in this area of production. Thus, the reproduction coefficients 
are only weakly related to the productivities in this sector. This situation changes 
drastically with the emergence of a market for the intermediate good. Now the 
reproduction coefficients of the specialised firms become narrowly connected to 
their productivities in their speciality. Therefore, they tend to focus their research, 
and thus the innovation effect increases significantly. The consequence of their 
focus for the selection effect is more ambivalent. During a transition period, an 
increased variance emerges, so the increased regression coefficient has fuel on 
which to work. This transition period may, however, be rather short. Low 
productivity firms quickly shift from make to buy, and competition among 
specialised suppliers means yet another decrease of variance. It is, however, 
obvious that Price’s formula gives us the discipline to analyse clearly all the 
stages.  
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 The two-level Price equation (5) may provide further help in structuring the 
problems. Thus, we may distinguish between the group of firms that that produces 
the intermediate good for its own use and the group of specialised suppliers. But 
this equation also forces us to define precisely the selection levels of the economic 
system. As long as there is only a well-developed market for final goods, each firm 
is selected according to the mean of its activity-specific productivities. Thus, inter-
firm selection concerns the firm as a whole, while intra-firm selection deals with 
individual activities. As soon as intermediate goods markets emerge, market 
selection works on (some of) the intra-firm activities, but this is also an area for 
intra-firm selection. So conflicts may emerge. When exchange has emerged, the 
generalist strategy implies relatively small productivity changes with respect to 
intermediate good i, while the specialist strategy secures a larger innovation effect 
because research is focussed. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has dealt with population thinking from a particular viewpoint: the need 
of analytical tools. Although the situation is by far satisfactory, we have today 
significantly sharpened forms of population analysis to confront the problems of 
economic evolution in a more efficient manner than has hitherto been the case. To 
describe the new situation, we may apply Schumpeter’s (1954, p. 39) formulation 
that ‘a new apparatus poses and solves problems for which the older authors could 
hardly have found answers even if they had been aware of them.’ The paper has 
demonstrated that population thinking is more multiform than normally 
recognised, and therefore it needs a complex analytical toolbox. However, an 
important theme of the paper was that Price’s equation for the decomposition of 
evolutionary change is surprisingly powerful in supporting manifold tasks of 
evolutionary analysis. So although it apparently is a simple extension of the 
statistically oriented intra-population analysis in the tradition of R. A. Fisher, it 
may also help to transcend this tradition. The reason is partly that Price’s equation 
avoids making strong assumptions about the kind of evolutionary processes that 
may be covered. This generality comes at a cost, namely that the equation is not 
sufficient to define a long-term path of evolutionary change. But this limitation 
should be seen as its strength rather than its weakness. For instance, it is far too 
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easy to forget about the web of inter-population links when a system of replicator 
equations is projected into the long run. Price’s equation helps us to be more 
modest by pointing to the many assumptions underlying such long-run dynamics. 
Presently, the major task for our understanding of economic evolution is, probably, 
to deepen our analysis of its shorter-term aspects. 
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